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A. CHARLENE SULLIVAN AND DEBRA A. DRECNIK 
Social Efficiency of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
With Regard to Personal Bankruptcy 
A sociaBy efficient bankruptcy law is one that would ha•e the effect or 
minimizing the present •aloe of social costs stemming from bankruptcy 
while permitting debtors to make a "fresh start." Analysis of a sample or 
petitions for personal nonbusiness bankruptcy filed under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act or 1978 shows that about 30 percent or petitions for 
Chapter 7 and about 25 percent of petitions for Chapter 13 were cases 
where social costs were not minimized as would be required under social-
ly efficient bankruptcy legislation. The social costs of Chapter 7 may be 
reduced under proposed reform (S.445 and H.R. 1800) as the judge 
would be prorided with information concerning estimates of debts repay-
able under both chapters and would disallow those Chapter 7 cases 
which represented a substantial abuse of bankruptcy law. The study data 
suggest that guidelines for acceptance or Chapter 13 cases should also be 
scrutinized. In particular, petitioners should be discouraged from pro-
l'iding "token" debt repayment plans while maintaining ownership or 
large accumulations of assets. 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was the product of many 
years of debate among lawyers and lawmakers. Although economists 
contributed little to the debate, the incidence and social cost of bank-
ruptcy have important economic implications, and socially efficient 
bankruptcy regulation is desirable. In this paper we evaluate the 
social efficiency of personal bankruptcy under the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
A "socially efficient" bankruptcy law is one that would provide 
that the present value of social costs stemming from bankruptcy be 
minimized while permitting debtors to make a "fresh start." The 
social costs of bankruptcy are the effects on the costs of credit for all 
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credit users which can be attributed to the acts of debtors voluntarily 
electing to seek relief from debts in bankruptcy court. Data collected 
from a sample of petitions for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 are used to 
assess 1) the social efficiency of the current law, and 2) whether sug-
gested reform would increase the social efficiency (reduce the social 
costs) of personal bankruptcy. 
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF BANKRUPTCY 
Before examining the social costs of bankruptcy, it is necessary to 
describe the nature of lending as well as mortgage and consumer 
credit markets. A loan, or credit instrument, is created when a lender 
exchanges a sum of money for a promise that the sum plus interest 
will be repaid. In a competitive market, the interest rate will reflect 
the lender's costs of making loans, including a risk-adjusted oppor-
tunity cost. 
In a world of uncertainty, there is a moral hazard risk of lending 
and unexpected events that may reduce the borrower's earnings 
stream and ability to repay the debt out of future earnings. The 
moral hazard risk is managed through such practices as analysis of an 
individual's credit-use history and lending to past borrowers, or 
deposit holders. The effect of unexpected events on the profitability 
of a loan can be reduced by 1) requiring the borrower to provide 
security, 2) using credit insurance, 3) requiring a compensating 
balance, and 4) lending only to consumers who have a low probabil-
ity of experiencing sharp changes in income or living expenses-those 
with high savings balances, stable employment, or established resi-
dences. 
Even with these risk-reducing management practices, there will be 
some amount of risk of bankruptcy lenders will be willing to incur at 
an interest rate that reflects that risk. The legal institution of bank-
ruptcy serves to limit the risk to borrowers of events not controllable 
by debtors that may adversely affect the debtors' ability to repay as 
scheduled-in effect, part of the risk is transferred to lenders. 
Lenders gain compensation for providing the insurance by incor-
porating a "bankruptcy" premium in the loan rate of charge. 1 When 
the risk of losses due to bankruptcy changes, in the long run, lenders 
'The authors thank Lawrence Shepard for comments related to this function of bankruptcy. 
will adjust the price and nonprice terms of credit to reflect changes in 
risk or the cost of controlling the risk; yet another option is to trans-
fer funds into an investment where an appropriate expected risk-
adjusted return is available. 2 
The social costs of bankruptcy are determined by the extent to 
which increases in creditors' costs of controlling the risk of bank-
ruptcy losses or higher expected bankruptcy losses are passed on to 
borrowers or potential borrowers in the form of higher credit costs or 
restrictions on the availability of credit. There is generally concern 
about the specific groups of consumers who may bear the social costs 
of a regulation. Since creditors often control expected losses of bank-
ruptcy by taking security, those classes of consumers who have no 
household equity to offer as security and who are in need of a cash 
loan are the most likely groups to bear the social costs of the recent 
liberalization of bankruptcy. 3 
THE DEBTOR'S CHOICE 
The purposes of bankruptcy are to provide a fresh start for debtors 
and to insure equity among creditors.4-5 An eligible debtor will choose 
bankruptcy when the expected benefits exceed the costs. 6 The bene-
fits of bankruptcy are the immediate cessation of collection activity, 
the value of assets exempted from creditors' claims, and liabilities 
discharged. The costs of bankruptcy include court costs, legal fees, 
social stigma of bankruptcy, and the loss of the expected value of 
benefits from future dealings with creditors. 7 
'Some economists argue that lenders do not behave in this manner. See Meckling (4) and 
Weston [I) for a summary of some of the arguments for and against this view of consumer 
financial markets. 
'Secured debts as a percentage of total consumer receivables at consumer finance companies 
grew from 61.6 percent to 78.3 percent between year-end 1979 and year-end 1983. (See Finance 
Facrs, October 1983.) 
'Sommer states elsewhere (6, p. 6) that in cases involving consumer debtors, the fresh start is 
the more significant purpose since there are usually few assets to be distributed, equitably or 
otherwise, to the creditors involved. 
'There is no legal definition of specific requirements for a fresh start. The Supreme Court 
described the fresh start as "a new opportunity in life, unhampered by the pressure and dis-
couragement of pre-existing debt." (See Local Loan Company v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234-244, 
1934.) 
'An eligible debtor is one who has not filed Chapter 7 for at least six years. 
'See Umbeck and Chatfield {JO] for a discussion of the role of the value of future dealing 
with creditors in optimal contracting. 
An insolvent debtor has several alternatives to seeking relief from 
debts under the bankruptcy code. 1 The first is to procrastinate on the 
payment of debts until the creditor writes the loan off as a bad debt 
loss. 9 The debtor's action would likely trigger legal debt collection 
activity by the creditor or an agent for the creditor. such as garnish-
ment, acceleration of debt payments, or accessment of attorneys' 
fees. These actions are taken at considerable cost to the debtor, and 
debtors seem to pref er bankruptcy to procrastination as a way to 
handle debt problems. ' 0 
The debtor could choose voluntary liquidation of assets to pay un-
secured creditors. So long as the liquidated value of assets exceeds the 
total of all creditors' claims, there is no dispute among creditors. 
However, if the liquidated value of assets is less than the total of 
creditors' claims, there will be conflict among creditors regarding the 
distribution of proceeds and a creditor would have an incentive to 
force the debtor into bankruptcy. Given the current legal procedure 
for personal bankruptcy, a debtor with total assets less than or equal 
to the value of creditors' claims would always voluntarily file bank-
ruptcy rather than voluntarily liquidate assets. In bankruptcy, the 
debtor does not forfeit all personal assets to repay debts but only 
assets net of personal and household exemptions. In addition, all 
unsecured debts not repayable with the proceeds of the asset sale are 
discharged. 
An insolvent debtor could also seek the help of a credit counselor 
who would intervene for the debtor with creditors to have debts ex-
cused or rearrange debt payment schedules. A debt counselor was the 
least frequently mentioned alternative to bankruptcy tried by the 
'In Sullivan (8, p. 59}, alternatives to bankruptcy tried by a sample of petitioners for Chapter 
7 were analyzed. Only eight percent of the sample had not tried one of the following alterna· 
tives: debt counseling [20 percent had tried), consolidating debts (34 percent], selling assets [21 
percent], or arranging different payment schedules [54 percent]. 
'Mors [5] argued that limiting bankruptcy discharge would not generate any social gains 
because the incidence of procrastination would increase, offsetting gains achieved by refusing 
discharge. 
"Apilado, et al. [1] showed that the incidence of bankruptcy was higher in states with liberal 
garnishment regulations. Data presented elsewhere (8, p. 37) show that an important factor 
leading to the decision to file bankruptcy by a small percentage of the sample of petitioners for 
Chapter 7 was collection activity initiated by creditors [suit (5 percent), garnishment (4 per· 
cent), repossession (I percent)). The low incidence of these actions suggests that the petitioners 
generally filed for bankruptcy before their debt problems became serious enough to trigger col· 
lection activity. 
sample of Chapter 7 petitioners described in [8]. The most frequent 
reasons given for not trying a counselor were that the debtors 
believed their debt burdens were too high or their income too low. 
Our debate for social efficiency does not include arguments for the 
elimination of the institution of bankruptcy. The question of the 
social efficiency of current bankruptcy procedures develops from the 
fact that debtors, once having made the decision to file for debt relief 
in the courts, are free to choose one of two avenues to debt relief. 
The debtor may continue making payments under the protection of 
the court, albeit at a level less than that specified in the original credit 
contract, keeping all assets intact (Chapter 13). Or, the debtor may 
have nonexempt assets liquidated by a trustee of the court to retire 
outstanding debts (Chapter 7). The rational debtor would choose 
that avenue with the higher valued fresh start (requiring the lowest 
debt repayment obligation). Socially efficient bankruptcy legislation 
would require the debtor to choose such that social costs were mini-
mized. 11 The two objectives are in direct conflict. We tum now to a 
discussion of the specific provisions of the law regarding personal 
bankruptcy and an empirical analysis of the social efficiency of the 
bankruptcy choices of a sample of cases filed under the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978. 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF FILING UNDER CHAPTER 13 OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE IN LIEU OF CHAPTER 7 
In liquidation (Chapter 7), all the debtor's nonexempt assets are 
converted to cash and distributed to creditors according to priority 
rules. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the debtor receives a dis-
charge of any debts that remain unpaid after the distribution of the 
proceeds from the sale of assets. 12 Under Chapter 13 the debtor pro-
poses a plan for payment of debts out of future income. The plan 
must be approved by the court and is carried out under court super-
vision; the debtor and usually all the debtor's property are protecJed 
from creditors by the court. At the conclusion of the case, the debtor 
receives a discharge from personal liability of most remaining unpaid 
debts. Currently, about 75 percent of all nonbusiness bankruptcies 
are filed under Chapter 7. 
"See White (12) for a discussion of socially efficient corporate bankruptcy. 
"Certain debts such as alimony, support to child or spouse, taxes, certain student loans, 
fines and penalties or debts for the willful injury of a third party are not dischargeable. 
Any petitioner may file for debt relief under Chapter 13 if out-
standing debts are under specified debt ceilings and there exists suffi-
cient regular income in excess of necessary living expenses to make 
debt payments. Regular income is not limited to earned wages, but 
may include welfare payments or income derived from the property 
of the estate. To exclude large business concerns from gaining protec-
tion under Chapter 13, the outstanding debt of an individual, or cou-
ple if the petition is jointly filed, must be below $100,000 for un-
secured debt and $350,000 for secured debt, including mortgage 
debt. 13 
To be approved, the proposed repayment plan must be 1) feasible, 
2) made in good faith, and 3) in the best interest of the unsecured 
creditors as compared to a Chapter 7 liquidation. Feasibility refers to 
the debtor's ability to make the proposed payments after basic living 
expenses and a cushion for unexpected expenses are deducted from 
regular income. There is considerable uncertainty as to what the good 
faith requirement means. In prior bankruptcy cases, "good faith" 
was defined as not abusing the "provisions, purpose or spirit, of the 
law." The last requirement means that unsecured creditors are to 
receive at least as much in repayment as they would if a debtor's non-
exempt assets were liquidated by the court. 14 
Once a petitioner has begun repayment under Chapter 13, two 
types of discharge are available. When all payments under the plan 
have been completed, a "full-payment" discharge releases the debtor 
from all remaining liabilities-even those debts that are nondis-
chargeable under Chapter 7 (with the exception of alimony and sup-
port payments and certain education loans). If the debtor is not able 
to complete all the payments of the plan, a hardship discharge may 
be granted under three conditions: 
1. if failing to complete the plan is due to circumstances beyond 
the debtor's control; 
2. if modification of the plan is not possible; and 
3. if the amount already repaid to unsecured creditors is not less 
than what they would have received under Chapter 7. 
"Note that this does not preclude small businesses from filing under Chapter 13. 
"In view of the last stipulation. the Chapter 13 petitioner will claim the highest amount of 
asset exemptions allowed by law and understate the value of assets. The plan would be con-
finned more readily if it appears that most of the petitioner's assets would be exempt and thus 
not available for liquidation to repay debt had the petitioner filed under Chapter 7. 
The payments proposed in the repayment plan must be such that 
"the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be paid 
under the plan on account to each allowed unsecured claim is not less 
than the amount that would be paid on the claim in a Chapter 7 
case." 15 One of the major sources of debate is whether unsecured 
creditors in a Chapter 13 case need ever receive more than they would 
receive if the debtor's estate were liquidated under Chapter 7. Evi-
dence of this debate is that plans that provide one percent payouts to 
unsecured creditors are approved in some courts while others insist 
on a more "meaningful" percentage [6, p. 95). In some courts, the 
"good faith" requirement is interpreted to require some kind of pay-
ment to unsecured creditors even though the petitioner may have 
been a "no asset" case under Chapter 7. In those courts where a 
"meaningful" payment to creditors is required in Chapter 13, 
debtors would likely find that Chapter 7 is the more attractive alter-
native. 
The statute places a lower limit on the amount a debtor has to 
repay in Chapter 13, which is based on the value of the debtor's non-
exempt assets rather than on ability to repay debts, "to insure that 
general unsecured creditors would not be harmed by the debtor's 
choice of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7" [6, p. 93). In the case where the 
limit is interpreted as an upper boundary, the law severs the relation-
ship between what a debtor repays in Chapter 13 and what he or she 
is "able" to repay out of expected income, given reasonable esti-
mates of living expenses. Bankruptcy procedures to minimize the 
social cost of bankruptcy would require the debtor to propose a 
"best effort" repayment plan and would allow the debtor to choose 
liquidation over Chapter 13 only when the proceeds from liquidation 
are equal to or exceed the present value of payments specified in the 
plan. In the current debate for reform, creditors argue that existing 
regulation is socially inefficient because the petitioner is allowed to 
choose liquidation, paying L, even though the debtor has sufficient 
income to repay more than L in Chapter 13. As a consequence, con-
sumers choose liquidation too frequently and thereby generate exces-
sive social costs of bankruptcy. 
In the following analysis the value of debts repaid under Chapter 7 
(L) and Chapter 13 (P) are estimated for two groups of petitioners. 
"II use 1325 (a) (4). 
One group actually filed under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code; the 
other group filed under Chapter 13 of the code. These data are then 
used to estimate the social efficiency of the bankruptcy choices made 
and the improvement that could be expected if petitioners' choices 
were limited. 
THE ANALYSIS 
The sample of petitioners for Chapter 7 includes 1,139 households 
who had filed a personal, nonbusiness bankruptcy petition from May 
through August of 1981. The sample was drawn randomly from the 
population of petitioners in ten states at the time of their first court 
appearance and included approximately 120 respondents from each 
state. 16 The states included were California, New York, Ohio, Illi-
nois, Georgia, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Wisconsin and 
Texas. Tests of nonresponse bias and comparisons with indepen-
dently drawn samples of Chapter 7 petitioners were made to reach 
the conclusion that the sample is representative of the population of 
petitioners for Chapter 7. 11 
The sample of petitioners for Chapter 13 includes 5,047 house-
holds who had filed repayment plans in the mid-summer of 1982 and 
whose plan had subsequently been approved. The data were collected 
from documents filed with an agent appointed by the court who pro-
vides bookkeeping services to the trustees of the Chapter 13 peti-
tioners. The sample included petitioners from the states of Cali-
fornia, New York, Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Tennes-
see, Arkansas and Mississippi. 18 
The data for both samples include information concerning total 
assets, total liabilities, exemptions, mortgage debt, and income 
(Table I). Court-approved payment plans were available for the 
Chapter 13 sample; "best effort" repayment plans were estimated 
for the Chapter 7 sample using taxable income, actual housing ex-
penses, taxes, and estimates of nonhousing living expenses based on 
dependents and including extraordinary medical and childcare ex-
penses. 
"The sample included 1,199 respondents, but 60 personal-business related cases were ex-
cluded from the analysis. 
"See [3] and [9] for the evalation of nonresponse bias and comparisons with other samples 
of petitioners for Chapter 7. 
"No state-by-state breakdown was available for this sample. 
TABLE I 
Mean Characteristics of Samples 
Chapter 7 
Average total assets $13,944 
(1,124) 
Average exemptions 6,383 
(1,112) 
Average income in year before filing 12,993 
(1,093) 
Average total debt 25,942 
(1,131)3 
Average mortgage debtb 30,319 
(332) 
a Excludes one case with $1.58 million in total debts. 
blncludes first and second mortgages on primary family residence. 
Note: Number of cases appear in parentheses. 
Estimate of Repayment Schedule for Chapter 7 Sample 
Chapter 13 
$38,247 
(5,040) 
12,097 
(4,982) 
16,342 (5,04 7) 
18,973 
(5,047) 
17,769 
(2,190) 
To be acceptable, repayment plans in Chapter 13 must be feasible, 
in good faith, and provide unsecured creditors with an amount equal 
to the expected proceeds of liquidation. It was assumed that a "good 
faith" plan was one that reflected the maximum amount the debtor 
could repay, given reasonable estimates of future income and neces-
sary living expenses. Estimating a repayment plan required specifica-
tions of future income and reasonable living expenses. 
Future income 
Almost 80 percent of the sample of petitioners for Chapter 7 listed 
at least one party who was employed full time when the petition was 
filed. To estimate future income, current taxable income was used 
unless it was significantly lower than annual income reported on the 
bankruptcy petition for the year before the petition was filed. If it 
was significantly lower, but the petitioner did not indicate that the 
bankruptcy was attributable to loss of employment, income for the 
previous year was used as an estimate of current income. Nontaxable 
income such as welfare and social security payments was not included 
in future income even though petitioners whose regular income 
comes from such sources are eligible for a Chapter 13 discharge. It 
was assumed that income over the 36-month repayment period would 
remain constant. 
Basic living expenses 
To estimate basic living expenses (BLE), it was assumed that peti-
tioners for Chapter 7 would retain their current residence (whether 
owned or rented) and all related housing expenses, and meet key 
extraordinary expenses such as medical or childcare. Necessary non-
housing living expenses were based on the living allowances defined 
by the Bureau of Census for families of different sizes living at the 
poverty level. (The estimate used here combined the base level plus a 
cushion of 10 percent of nonhousing expenses plus actual housing ex-
penses in the final calculation of necessary living expenses.) Adjust-
ments were made in the BLE estimates to reflect regional and com-
munity differences in the cost of living for low-income families. No 
adjustment for inflation was made in the estimates of future income 
or necessary living expenses although the estimated repayment plan 
extends over three years. This assumption of no inflation would 
understate ••ability to repay'' rather than overstate it if living ex-
penses and income grew at the same rate of inflation over the repay-
ment period. Tax liabilities were estimated based on the standard 
deduction and deductions for dependents. 
Ability to repay debts 
Basic living expenses were deducted from estimated future income 
to determine the monthly amount available to repay nonmortgage 
debts. 19 A maximum repayment period of 36 months was used to 
estimate the percentage of nonmortgage debts repayable in the repay-
ment period (Table 2). 
Slightly more than half of the Chapter 7 sample who provided data 
necessary to make the calculations could repay none of their non-
mortgage debts out of income after living expenses, because their 
"Mortgage debts were excluded because the debtor-homeowner was assumed to maintain 
current housing arrangements. Debts related to business were also excluded but were generally 
secured debts that could be repaid from liquidation of collateral. 
TABLE 2 
Simulated Repayment Plan for Chapter 7 Petitioners 
Percentage of Debt 
Repayable Within 36 Months8 
0% 
1-20% 
21-40% 
41-60% 
61-80% 
81-100% 
Greater than 100% 
Not ascertained 
N 
526 
72 
58 
56 
42 
48 
210 
127 
1,139 
Percent 
52.0% 
7.1 
5.7 
5.5 
4.2 
4.7 
20.8 
100.0% 
8Provides no cushion in nonhousing living expenses above the poverty level standards. 
necessary annual living expenses equalled or exceeded the estimate of 
future annual income. The present value of debt payments out of in-
come (P) is equal to zero for this group, and their choice of liquida-
tion over Chapter 13 was socially efficient-the value of assets liqui-
dated in Chapter 7 (L) had to be greater than or equal to zero. The 
present value of debt payments out of income after necessary living 
expenses was greater than zero for the rest of the Chapter 7 sample. 
In fact, almost 20 percent of the sample could have repaid 100 per-
cent of their debts out of income after necessary expenses in less than 
36 months. 
One might argue that the estimates of living expenses made in the 
study were too restrictive, thus providing a spurious view of the abil-
ity of petitioners for Chapter 7, in general, to repay debts out of in-
come. To evaluate the validity of this argument, the distributions of 
these estimates for living expenses and monthly debt payment as a 
percent of income were compared with those provided in the court-
approved plans of the Chapter 13 sample. 
Comparison of Expenses and Repayment Schedules for 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Samples 
Proportion of nonmortgage debts repayable in three years 
Consumers admitted to Chapter 13 proposed repayment plans 
which provided for the repayment of approximately the same mean 
percentage of nonmortgage debts as was possible in the simulated 
plans for the Chapter 7 sample (66 percent vs. 68 percent). However, 
the distributions of the ratio of percentage of debts repaid were sig. 
nificantly different for the two samples (Table 3). One would expect 
repayment plans proposed by consumers in Chapter 13 to be based 
on liberal estimates of necessary living expenses and the total amount 
paid to be the minimum allowed by law (P = L). 20 
The fact that the distributions of the payout ratios are significantly 
different suggest that the "best effort" assumption was more oner-
ous than standards typically applied to plans actually approved under 
Chapter 13. The Chapter 13 sample was more likely to fall in the 
61-80 percent of debts repaid category than in the 81-100 percent 
category. The opposite was true for the Chapter 7 sample. It is not 
logical that a petitioner for Chapter 13 would incur the expenses of 
bankruptcy and propose a plan to repay 100 percent of outstanding 
debts, even though there may have been income sufficient to do so. 
However, the best effort plans showed that about 20 percent of peti· 
tioners for Chapter 7 could have proposed such a plan. Thus, the dif-
ference in the distributions of ability to repay does not necessarily 
'"Assuming all other things constant, the first n dollars recovered under Chapter 7 or 
Chapter 13 goes to secured creditors. Thus, unsecured creditors receive L-n or P-n. Conse-
quently, the condition P > L satisfies the third requirement for an acceptable repayment plan. 
TABLE 3 
Payout Ratios for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Petitioners 
Percentage of Debt 
Repayable in Three Years 
1·20% 
21-40% 
41-60% 
61-80% 
81-100% 
Missing 
Mean percentage of debts 
repayable in three years 
x2 = 19.o7, P < .01. 
Chapter 7a 
(Basic Living 
Expense+ 10% of 
Nonhousing Expenses) 
11.9% 
15.7 
11.7 
10.9 
49.8 
100.0% 
68% 
Chapter 13 
13.0% 
12.9 
12.8 
17.2 
44.0 
0.2 
100.0% 
66% 
alncludes only those petitioners for Chapter 7 whose "best effort" repayment plans provided 
some positive repayment to creditors. 
TABLE 4 
Living Expenses as a Percentage of Pretax Income 
Living Expenses as 
Percentage of Pretax Income 
0% 
1-20% 
21-40% 
41~0% 
61-80% 
81-99% 
Mean 
Chapter 7 
Basic Living Expense 
+ 10% Cushion 
0 
1.3% 
1.3 
12.9 
40.9 
43.7 
100.0% 
74.9% 
Chapter 13 
2.6% 
0.5 
L5 
7.9 
36.l 
51.4 
100.0% 
75.6% 
lead to the conclusion that the estimates of necessary living expenses 
for the Chapter 7 sample are unreasonably conservative. Rather, the 
difference reflects the fact that it is not logical for petitioners for 
Chapter 13 to propose to repay 100 percent of their debts. And this 
circumstance is reflected in the study's formula for estimating ability 
to repay in that the formula shows that some petitioners had the 
financial ability to repay all debts out of income but were using the 
flexibility of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid having to do so. 
Ratio of living expenses to pretax income 
For the Chapter 13 sample, necessary living expenses claimed by 
petitioners in their repayment plans were, on average, 75.6 percent of 
pretax income (Table 4). About five out of every ten petitioners for 
Chapter 13 claimed living expenses that were between 81 and 99 per-
cent of before-tax income. The definition of basic living expenses 
(BLE) for the Chapter 7 sample (110 percent of nonhousing BLE plus 
actual housing expenses), resulted in a mean of the ratio of expenses 
to income of 74.9 percent with almost 4.5 out of ten petitioners hav-
ing living expenses that absorbed between 80 and 99 percent of pretax 
income. 
Ratio of annual debt payment to pretax income 
For each petitioner in each sample, a three-year payout period was 
assumed. For those who could repay 100 percent of debts in less than 
three years, given their reported or calculated annual debt payment 
(for Chapter 7, this was equal to annual after-tax income minus total 
living expenses), a simulated annual debt payment was calculated 
equal to total debt divided by three years. 
The average simulated annual debt payment calculated for the 
Chapter 7 sample was 18.3 percent of pretax income relative to an 
average of 15.6 percent for the Chapter 13 sample (Table 5). Slightly 
more than three-fourths of the petitioners for Chapter 13 had debt 
payments representing one percent to 20 percent of the pretax income 
range relative to about 63 percent range of the Chapter 7 sample. 
Approximately 35 percent of the Chapter 7 sample and about 25 
percent of the Chapter 13 sample had planned debt repayment obli-
gations that exceeded 20 percent of annual income. Credit counselors 
suggest that when debt payment obligations absorb more than 20 per-
cent of income, the consumer has little cushion in the family budget 
for emergency expenses or for absorbing the shock of sudden fluc-
tuations in income. Thus, one would expect that about a quarter of 
actual Chapter 13 payment plans would not be completed at all or 
would be completed with some hardship to the household. 
SOCIAL EFFICIENCY OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978 
A comparison of the liquidation value of the petitioners' estates 
and the present value of scheduled (or simulated) payments for the 
two groups of petitioners allows one to estimate the frequency of 
bankruptcy cases in the two samples (Chapter 7 and Chapter 13) for 
TABLES 
Annual Consumer Debt Payment to Income Ratio 
Annual Debt Payment 
to Pretax Income 
1-20% 
21-40% 
41..()0% 
61-80% 
81-100% 
Missing 
Mean percentage of annual 
debt payments to pretax income 
Chapter 7 
(Basic Living 
Expense+ IO% of 
Nonhousing Expenses) 
62.8% 
32.3 
3.8 
0.3 
0.0 
0.8 
100.0% 
18.3% 
Chapter 13 
76.0% 
20.7 
3.0 
0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0% 
15.6% 
TABLE 6 
Analysis of Creditors' Recovery Under Bankruptcy Alternatives 
Present Value Present Value Present Value 
Payments> Payments= Payments< 
Liquidation Liquidation Liquidation 
Value Valuea Value Total 
Zero monthly discount rate 
for payments 
Chapter 7 31.7% 9.2% 59.1% 100% 
Chapter 13 73.3 0 26.6 100% 
Two percent monthly discount 
rate for payments 
Chapter 7 27.2 9.2 63.6 100% 
Chapter 13 62.0 0 38.0 100% 
Fifty percent discount on 
liquidation value with two 
percent monthly '.{!scount 
rate for payments 
Chapter 7 34.1 9.2 56.8 100% 
Chapter 13 69.5 0 30.4 100% 
8 For Chapter 7 sample, P was zero and L was negative. 
bstanley and Girth [ 3) indicated that in cases where assets were actually sold by the trustee 
the members of the petitioner's family would frequently buy the assets. In those cases the 
proceeds realized from the sale were very low. 
which the bankruptcy option having the lowest social cost was 
chosen. The present value of the monthly debt payments (P) for each 
petitioner in both groups of petitioners was calculated using 0, l, and 
2 percent monthly discount rates. The net liquidation value (L) of the 
estate of petitioners in each group who provided sufficient informa-
tion was calculated by subtracting mortgage debt plus asset exemp-
tions from the market value of total assets. 
Even at a zero discount rate, the present value of estimated month-
ly payments for the Chapter 7 sample was less than the net liquida-
tion value of the petitioners' nonexempt estates for almost 60 percent 
of the petitioners under Chapter 7 (Table 6). 21 The choice made by 
those petitioners to liquidate was socially efficient, because the social 
costs arising from the liquidation were less than what would have 
been incurred had the petitioners filed under Chapter 13 and repaid 
"All petitioners for Chapter 7, including those who could have repaid nothing out of income 
were included in this comparison. We found previously that 50 percent of the Chapter 7 sample 
had P = O. 
debts out of income. For about one-third of the petitioners for 
Chapter 7, the present value of payments, P, was greater than the li-
quidation value of the estate, L. By our definition, these bankrupt-
cies, though legal, were not socially efficient because the petitioners 
were not required to choose the bankruptcy option that would have 
provided the lowest social cost. 22 For the balance of the sample the 
present value of monthly payments and the liquidation value of 
assets were equal to zero. 23 
About 75 percent of the petitioners for Chapter 13 were scheduled 
to repay more of their debts under the reorganization plans approved 
by the court (assuming zero discount rate) than they would have been 
able to pay from liquidation of assets under Chapter 7. (This pro-
vides an interesting datum concerning how "good faith" is being 
defined in the states represented by the Chapter 13 sample.) Thus, 
their choice of continuation over liquidation was socially efficient. 
The balance of the sample had court-approved plans that allowed 
them to pay less than they would have paid if they had filed under 
Chapter 7. These repayment plans did not satisfy the legal definition 
for a minimally acceptable plan. 24 
IMPACT OF REFORM 
This analysis shows that about one-third of petitions filed by the 
sample of Chapter 7 petitioners did not represent socially efficient 
bankruptcy choices. A pending reform of the bankruptcy law would 
require a debtor to file conditionally under either Chapter 7 or Chap-
ter 13. The debtor would then receive counseling from the bank-
ruptcy trustee concerning his or her rights under both Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13. If the bankruptcy judge determined that a discharge 
under Chapter 7 would constitute a "substantial abuse" of the bank· 
ruptcy system, the judge would be allowed to dismiss the case. With 
no definition of "substantial abuse," it is not clear whether the 
"In Chapter 13, petitioners are not required to propose a "best effort" plan as we defined ii 
in this analysis. Consequently, some of the cases in this group may represent socially efficient 
choices, given a more generous definition of necessary living expenses. 
"In some cases the value of exemptions exceeded the value of total assets. The maximum 
value allowed exemptions were listed on the petition to reduce consequences of any challenges 
that might be made to the initial asset valuation by creditors. 
"In the case that a proposed plan does not meet this standard, a creditor may challenge ii 
and the court need not confirm the plan. 
reform would reduce the incidence of socially inefficient bankruptcy. 
However, a case could be made for defining "substantial abuse" as a 
choice which provides a repayment of debts that is less than what the 
debtor could reasonably afford to pay out of income. Extrapolating 
the results oft.he study's sample to the population of debtors filing 
under Chapter 7 in 1981, that reform would have reduced losses to 
bankruptcy by $600 to $757 million in that year alone (see Appendix). 
The results of the analysis of Chapter 13 cases showed that, in 
general, debtors were not proposing plans that just satisfied the "best 
interest of creditors" test but were evidently being held to a more 
onerous standard. However, the analysis also revealed that the 
stated minimal standard is being enforced with considerable laxity. In 
about 25 percent of the cases, the present value of the repayment plan 
(using a zero monthly discount rate) was less than the liquidation 
value of nonexempt assets. It was estimated that the annual reduction 
in bankruptcy losses from a sample of Chapter 13 petitions and 
repayment plans filed in 1981 would range between $220 and $270 
million if those petitioners had been forced to abide by the wording 
of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Earlier it was shown that about 20 percent of a sample of petition-
ers for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act could have repaid 100 percent of their nonmortgage 
debts out of income after living expenses within a three-year repay-
ment period [3). Another 28 percent of the sample could have repaid 
some portion of their nonmortgage debts out of income. If petition-
ers for Chapter 7 who could repay a reasonable portion of their debts 
out of income were required to do so, it was estimated that annual 
bankruptcy losses would be reduced by $800 million to $1.1 billion. 
These data were presented in testimony in support of legislative 
reform which would have required petitioners for personal bank-
ruptcy to file under Chapter 13 if it was determined that they could 
repay a "reasonable portion of debts." 
The goal of those arguing for reform in bankruptcy legislation was 
to reduce "abuse" of bankruptcy while maintaining provisions that 
provided a fresh start for debtors who had lost control of their finan-
cial affairs. In this paper we define socially efficient bankruptcy legis-
lation as that which would minimize the present value of the social 
cost of bankruptcy while allowing debtors to have a fresh start. To 
minimize social costs a petitioner would be required to choose the 
route to debt relief (Chapter 7 or Chapter 13) that would provide the 
highest value of debts repaid. 
To evaluate the incidence of socially inefficient bankruptcy choice 
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, we estimated the amount 
of debts repaid for samples of petitioners who filed in 1981-1982 
under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. For both samples, we estimated the 
present value of debts repaid if assets were liquidated and if a ''best 
effort" repayment plan was effectuated. 
About 30 percent of petitioners who filed under Chapter 7 could 
have repaid a higher percentage of their debts if they had filed under 
Chapter 13 while still earning the benefits of bankruptcy-a fresh 
start. This would have provided a reduction in total bankruptcy costs 
in 1981 of between $600 million and $757 million per year. For the 
rest of the Chapter 7 sample, debts written off would be the same or 
greater if petitioners had filed under Chapter 13. Debt discharges for 
about 25 percent of the sample of Chapter 13 petitions would have 
been lower if those petitioners had filed under Chapter 7. These sav-
ings were estimated at about $250 million per year. 
The wording of bankruptcy reform which is being considered 
[S.445] would require that the judge be given sufficient information 
to reject petitioners for liquidation that represent a "substantial 
abuse'' of the bankruptcy system. The results of this study show that 
if "substantial abuse" were defined to eliminate those cases where 
the proceeds from the liquidation of assets was less than the present 
value of payments out of income after necessary living expenses, the 
social costs of bankruptcy would be reduced. However, the study 
results suggest that all petitions, not just those for Chapter 7, should 
be evaluated. Many petitioners for Chapter 13 could have repaid a 
greater percentage of their debts if they had been required to liqui-
date their estate rather than repay debts out of future income. 
APPENDIX 
Estimate of Reduction of Bankruptcy Losses from 
Change in Bankruptcy Guidelines 
Chapter 7 
To calculate the reduction in bankruptcy losses which might be expected if consumers were 
required to choose that chapter which provided the lowest social cost of bankruptcy, the dollar 
savings were specified as: annual number of filings under chapter nationally x percent of peti-
tioners under chapter that would have repaid higher dollar value of debts under alternative 
chapter x dollar excess that would have been paid on debts under alternative chapter. The 
dollar value of savings was calculated using both a 0 percent and 2 percent monthly discount 
rate to calculate the present value of payments under the "best effort" plan (P) and a 0 percent 
and a 50 percent discount on the liquidated value of assets sold to retire debts (L). 
Zero monthly discount rate for payments under plan 
Present value of payments was greater than liquidation value of assets for 31. 7 percent of the 
Chapter 7 sample (Table 6). The present value of payments (P) exceeded liquidation value of 
assets (L) by an average of $10,494.96 for that group. The steady state estimate for total non-
business bankruptcy cases filed in 1981 was 315,000 with 72.2 percent filed under Chapter 7. 
The estimated dollar savings of requiring those Chapter 7 petitioners for whom P> L to file 
under Chapter 13, assuming 0 percent monthly discount rate is: 
Estimated number of Chapter 7 cases in 1981 
Percent of Chapter 7 sample with P > L 
Average dollar value of savings per petition in group with P > L: P-L = 
Expected savings if those petitioners for Chapter 7 with P > L 
227,540• 
31.7870 
$10,495 
were required to pay P rather than L: 
227,540 x .317 x $10,495 = $757.06 million 
Two percent monthly discount rate, 50 percent discount of liquidation value 
Dollar value of savings per Chapter 7 petitioner with P > L: P-L = $7,743 
34. l % Percent of Chapter 7 sample with P > L: 
Expected savings if those Chapter 7 petitioners with P > L were 
required to pay P rather than L: 
227,540 x .341 x $7,743 = $600.78 million 
Chapter 13 
Zero monthly discount rate for payments under plan 
Estimated number of Chapter 13 cases in 1981: 
Average dollar value of savings per petition in group with L > P: 
Percent of Chapter 13 sample with L > P (Table 6): 
Estimate of savings: 87,460 x .266 x $11,655 = $271 million 
87,460• 
L-P = $11,654.78 
26.6% 
Two percent monthly discount rate, 50 percent discount of 
liquidation value 
Average dollar value of savings per petition in group with L> P: L-P = 
Percent of Chapter 13 sample with L >P (Table 6): 
Estimate of savings: 87,460 x .304 x 58,302 = 220.73 million 
Total Savings from Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 
Zero discount rate, liquidation value equal to 100% of market value 
S757.04m + S27lm = Sl.028 billion 
Two percent monthly discount rate, liquidation value equal to 
50 percent of market value 
S<i00.78m + S220.73m = 5821.Sl million 
$8,302 
30.4170 
•For comparison purposes we used the estimate of number of bankruptcy cases that was used 
in [3]. The actual total number of cases filed from July 1, 1980 to June 30, 1981was312,914 
with 86,778 Chapter 13 cases (72.3'1a). 
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